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ROUND THE WORLD
Nuclear Proliferation
BUSH STRATEGY CONTAINING
By Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra
(School of International Studies, JNU)
New Delhi, December 17, 2007
After years of expressing concerns, imposing sanctions and
threatening military intervention to prevent Iran from
developing its nuclear weapons capability, the US intelligence
assessment has revealed that Iran stopped its nuclear weapon
programme way back in 2003.
Why was such information not shared earlier? What was the need
to raise a hue and cry over Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons
programme? What was the motive behind the diplomatic offensive
against Tehran’s claimed civilian nuclear programme?
If such a revelation had come earlier, the votes in the IAEA,
the debate in the UN Security Council and the European Union’s
(EU) Troika’s painstaking exercises and the Iranian
President’s critical remarks and rhetoric would not have been
necessary or at least would not have acerbic contents.
Did it take four years for the US intelligence community to
establish that Iran did not have a nuclear weapon ambition
since 2003? Any attempt to answer this question would not be
credible. That simply means that the Bush Administration has
had a highly sophisticated approach to contain the spread of
nuclear weapons, particularly in the Third World.
Significantly, the Iranian President Ahmedinezad was quick to
celebrate this piece of information by announcing his victory.
What was the victory about? Was it that President Bush was
wrong in claiming the existence of an Iranian nuclear weapon
programme? Was it that his claim of the civilian nature of the
country’s nuclear activities was vindicated by the American
intelligence officers?
The fact remains that it was at best a Pyrrhic victory. Tehran
did not refute Washington’s intelligence claim that it had a
nuclear weapon programme prior to 2003. By implication,
President Bush was right in denying an ability to Iran to
perfect the art of enriching uranium, because that could have
enabled Iran to restart its weapon programme any time it chose
to do so. And that means all the US effort to prevent Iran
from enriching uranium on its soil was not an exercise in
futility. That also means future American effort to keep the
heat on Tehran on the nuclear issue would aim at preventing
further spread of nuclear weapons.
Was it not a smart move? It was. The Bush Administration
perhaps timed the revelation of this intelligence assessment
to prevent the regional concerns over an impending or imminent
American military intervention in Iran. Keeping in mind the
forthcoming Presidential elections and the Democratic Party’s
stand on Iraq, the Republican President did not want to create
political problems for the Presidential nominee of the party.
Simultaneously, President Bush could claim success in handling
the Iranian nuclear ambition without going in for costly
intervention. The reluctance of the European and Asian allies
and the Gulf countries to support any US plan for military
action against Iran could certainly raise the political cost
of intervention.
Moreover, domestic opposition to any further military
adventure abroad against the backdrop of the worsening
situation in Afghanistan and the rising expenses of holding on
Iraq could have made an intervention in Iran prohibitively
costly in terms of finances.
Further, the Bush Administration has been able to rule out any
intervention in Iran in time, simultaneously making it
difficult for Tehran to indulge in any kind of nuclear
commerce with other countries or even in the nuclear black
market.
In fact, exposure of the Abdul Qadeer Khan international
nuclear black market is another achievement that the US
Administration can take credit for. By turning the father of
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme into an international
criminal, Washington has sought to restrict Islamabad’s
nuclear activities. It would be difficult for Pakistan too to
search for nuclear weapons-related materials and equipment in
a clandestine manner at least to an extent it was able to do
earlier.
The next achievement of the Bush White House in containing
nuclear proliferation is encouraging Libya to give up the
nuclear weapon path. This was done by adopting an approach
that combined persuasion and pressure, reward and punishment.
To some extent, the US unilateralism demonstrated in the
invasion of Iraq and removal of Saddam Hussein from power had
influenced Libya and Iran to change course in their nuclear
activities.
Incidentally, the Bush Administration justified military
intervention in Iraq on the ground of destroying that
country’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) arsenals. No WMD
was found later and the Administration had to face severe
criticism at home and abroad. But it claims that the military
intervention has at least achieved in creating an Iraq that
would be rid of any infrastructure of WMD production.
The most spectacular success of the President Bush in
containing nuclear proliferation can be seen in the Korean
Peninsula. By adopting a multi-lateral approach and a
hard-line policy of refusing bilateral negotiations, the Bush
Administration was able to persuade the North Korean regime to
roll back its nuclear weapon programme.
After South Africa, North Korea is the second country to give
up its acquired nuclear weapon capability. The difference is
that South Africa claimed that it had destroyed its nuclear
weapons, which no one had seen. But the world had witnessed
the testing of a nuclear device by North Korea.
Last but not the least, the Bush Administration has devised a
novel approach to deal with the proliferation issue with
India. The US-India nuclear deal aims at making India a
partner in non-proliferation and encouraging New Delhi to turn
65 per cent of its nuclear reactors into energy producing
machines.
Among the nuclear capable countries outside the recognized
P-5, India happens to be the only country that has the
potential to become a major global player. Keeping in mind
this factor, the Bush Administration has attempted to
establish a strategic partnership with a nuclear India.
While Washington’s policy towards Iraq, Iran, North Korea and
Libya and to some extent Pakistan have shown positive outcomes
in varying degrees, Indo-US nuclear deal continues to be under
a dark cloud. It is likely that by the time Americans get
ready to vote for a new Presidential candidate, the Bush
Administration would be able to claim unprecedented success in
nuclear non-proliferation. ---- INFA
(Copyright India News & Feature Alliance)
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